We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost and each voter assigns to each item a certain value. The goal is to select a subset of items with the total cost not exceeding the budget, in a way that is consistent with the voters' preferences. Since the preferences of the voters over the items can vary significantly, we need a way of aggregating these preferences, in order to select the socially most preferred valid knapsack. We study three approaches to aggregating voters preferences, which are motivated by the literature on multiwinner elections and fair allocation. This way we introduce the concepts of individually best, diverse, and fair knapsack. We study computational complexity (including parameterized complexity, and complexity under restricted domains) of computing the aforementioned concepts of multiagent knapsacks.
Introduction
In the classic knapsack problem we are given a set of items, each having a cost and a value, and a budget. The goal is to find a subset of items with the maximal sum of the values subject to the constraint that the total cost of the selected items must not exceed the budget. In this paper we are studying the following variant of the knapsack problem: instead of having a single objective value for each item we assume that there is a set of agents (also referred to as voters) who have potentially different valuations of the items. When choosing a subset of items we want to take into account possibly conflicting preferences of the voters with respect to which items should be selected: in this paper we discuss three different approaches to how the voters' valuations can be aggregated.
Multiagent knapsack forms an abstract model for a number of real-life scenarios. First, observe that it is a natural generalization of the model for multiwinner elections [19] to the case where the items come with different costs (in the literature on multiwinner elections, items are often called candidates). Multiwinner voting rules are applicable in a broad class of scenarios, ranging from selecting a representative committee of experts, through recommendation systems [34] 1 , to resource allocation [37, 50, 49] and facility location problems [21] . In each of these settings it is quite natural to consider that different items/candidates can incur different costs. Further, algorithms for multiagent knapsack can be viewed as tools for the participatory budgeting problem [9] , where the authorities aggregate citizens' preferences in order to decide which of the potential local projects should obtain funding.
Perhaps the most straightforward way to aggregate voters' preferences is to select a subset (a knapsack) that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all the voters over all the selected items. This approach-which we call selecting an individually best knapsacksubject to differences in methods used for elicitating voters' preferences, has been taken by Benabbou and Perny [3] , and in the context of participatory budgeting by Goel et al. [28] and Benade et al. [4] . However, by selecting an individually best knapsack we can discriminate even large minorities of voters, which is illustrated by the following simple example: assume that the set of items can be divided into two subsets, A 1 and A 2 , that all items have the same unit cost, and that 51% of the voters like items from A 1 (assigning the utility of 1 to them, and the utility of 0 to the other items) and the remaining 49% of voters like only items from A 2 . An individually best knapsack would contain only items from A 1 , that is 49% of the voters would be effectively disregarded.
In this paper we introduce two other approaches to aggregating voters' preferences for selecting a collective knapsack. One such approach-which we call selecting a diverse knapsack -is inspired by the Chamberlin-Courant rule [11] from the literature on multiwinner voting. Informally speaking, in this approach we aim at maximizing the number of voters who have at least one preferred item in the selected knapsack. For the second approachwhich is the main focus of the paper and which we call selecting a fair knapsack -we use the concept of Nash welfare [39] from the literature on fair allocation. Nash welfare is a solution concept that implements a tradeoff between having an objectively efficient resource allocation (knapsack, in our case), and having an allocation which is acceptable for a large population of agents. Indeed, the properties of Nash welfare have been recently extensively studied in the literature on fair allocation [10, 38, 14, 46] and this solution concept has been considered e.g., in the context of public decision making [12] , online resource allocation [25] or transmission congestion control [29] (where it is referred to as proportional fairness). Thus, our work introduces a new application domain-where the goal is to select a set of shared items-for the concept of Nash welfare. In particular, as a side note, we will explain that our approach leads to a new class of multiwinner rules, which can be viewed as generalizations of the Proportional Approval Voting rule [54] beyond the approval setting.
Apart from introducing the new class of multiagent knapsack problems, our contribution is the following: (1) We study the complexity of computing an optimal individually best, diverse, and fair knapsack. This problem is in general hard, except for the case of individually best knapsack with the utilities of the voters represented in unary encoding.
(2) We study the parameterized complexity of the problem, focusing on the number of voters. Considering this parameter is relevant, e.g., for the case when the set of voters is in fact a relatively small group of experts acting on behalf of a larger population of agents. Redelegating the task of evaluating the items to the committee of experts is reasonable for several reasons. For instance, coming up with accurate valuations of items may require a specialized knowledge and a significant cognitive effort, and so it would often be impossible to evaluate items efficiently and accurately among a large group of common people. We show that for unary-encoded utilities of the voters computing a diverse knapsack is FPT when parameterized by the number of voters. On the other hand, the problem of computing a fair knapsack is W[1]-hard for the same parameter.
(3) We study the complexity of the considered problems for single-peaked and singlecrossing preferences. We show that (under unary encoding of voters' utilities) a diverse knapsack can be computed efficiently when the preferences are single-peaked or single-crossing. Interestingly, computing fair knapsack stays NP-hard even when the preferences are both single-peaked and single-crossing.
Our results are summarized in Table 1 . We additionally show that all three problems are NP-hard in the non-unary case (Theorems 3 and 6) and prove fixed-parameter intractability for the parameter being the budget (Proposition 2 and Corollary 1).
The Model
For any pair of natural numbers i, j ∈ N, i ≤ j, by [i, j] we denote the set {i, i + 1, . . . , j}. Further, by [j] we denote the set [1, j] .
Let V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } be the set of n voters and A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } be the set of m items. The voters have preferences over the items, which are represented as a utility profile u = (u i (a) | i ∈ [n], a ∈ A): for each i ∈ [n] and a ∈ A we use u i (a) to denote the utility that v i assigns to a; this utility quantifies the extent to which v i enjoys a. We assume that all utilities are nonnegative integers.
Each item a ∈ A comes with a cost c(a) ∈ N, and we are given a global budget B. We call a knapsack a subset S of items whose total cost does not exceed B, that is c(S) = a∈S c(a) ≤ B. Our goal is to select a knapsack that would be, in some sense, most preferred by the voters. Below, we describe three representative rules which extend the preferences of the individual voters over individual items to their aggregated preferences over all knapsacks. Each such a rule induces a corresponding method for selecting the best knapsack. Our rules are motivated with concepts from the literature on fair division and on multiwinner elections:
Individually best knapsack: this is the knapsack S which maximizes the total utility of the voters from the selected items u IB (S) = a∈S v i ∈V u i (a). This defines perhaps the most straightforward way to select the knapsack: we call it individually best, because the formula u IB (S) treats the items separately and does not take into account fairnessrelated issues. Indeed, such a knapsack can be very unfair, which is illustrated by the following example:
Example 1. Let B be an integer, and consider a set of n = B voters and m = B 2 items, all having a unit cost (c(a) = 1 for each a ∈ A). Let us rename the items so that A = {a x,y | x, y ∈ [B]} and consider the following utility profile:
for some large L ∈ N. In this case, the individually best knapsack is S IB = {a 1,y | y ∈ B}, that is it consists only of the items liked by a single voter v 1 . At the same time, there exists a much more fair knapsack S Fair = {a x,1 | x ∈ B} that for each voter v ∈ V contains an item liked by v.
Diverse knapsack: this is the knapsack S that maximizes the utility u Div (S) defined as u Div (S) = v i ∈V max a∈S u i (a). In words, in the definition of u Div we assume that each voter cares only about his or her most preferred item in the knapsack. This approach is inspired by the Chamberlin-Courant rule [11] from the literature on multiwinner elections and by classic models from the literature on facility location [21] . We call such a knapsack diverse following the convention from the multiwinner literature [19] . Intuitively, such a knapsack represents the diversity of the opinions among the population of voters; in particular, if the preferences of the voters are very diverse, such a knapsack tries to incorporate the preferences of as many groups of voters as possible at the cost of containing only one representative item for each "similar" group.
Fair knapsack: we use Nash welfare [39] as a solution concept for fairness. Formally, we call a knapsack S fair if it maximizes the product u Fair (S) = v i ∈V 1 + a∈S u i (a) . 2 Alternatively, by taking the logarithm of u Fair we can represent fair knapsack as the one maximizing v i ∈V log(1 + a∈S u i (a)).
In Section 1 we referred the reader to the literature supporting the use of Nash welfare in various settings. Let us complement these arguments with one additional observation. When the utilities of the voters come from the binary set {0, 1} and costs of all items are equal to one, then our multiagent knapsack framework boils down to the standard multiwinner elections model with approval preferences. In such a case, a very appealing rule, Proportional Approval Voting [19, 54] , can be expressed as finding a knapsack maximizing
, where H(i) is the i-th harmonic number. This is almost equivalent to finding a fair knapsack (maximizing the Nash welfare) since the harmonic function can be viewed as a discrete version of the logarithm. Thus, fair knapsack can be considered a generalization of PAV to the model with cardinal utilities and costs. In particular (as a side note), observe that the notion of fair knapsack combined with positional scoring rules induces rules that can be viewed as an adaptations of PAV to the ordinal model.
Related Work
Our work extends the literature on the multi-objective (MO) knapsack problem, that is on the variant of the classic knapsack problem with multiple independent functions valuating the items. Typically, in the MO knapsack problem the goal is to find a (the set of) Pareto optimal solution(s) according to multiple objectives defined through given functions valuating items. Our approach is different since we consider specific forms of aggregating the objectives; in particular each of the concepts we study-the individually best, diverse and fair knapsack-is a Pareto optimal solution. For an overview of the literature on the MO knapsack problem (with the focus on the analysis of heuristic algorithms) we refer the reader to the survey by Lust and Teghem [35] .
Multidimensional (MD) knapsack is yet another generalization of the original knapsack problem; in the MD knapsack we have multiple cost constraints (each item comes with different costs for different constraints), and the goal is to maximize a single objective while respecting all the constraints. Approximation algorithms for the problem with submodular objective functions have been considered, e.g., by Kulik et al. [30] , Sviridenko [53] , and Lee et al. [32] . Further, Fréville [26] and Puchinger et al. [45] provide an overview of heuristic algorithms for the problem. Finally, Florios et al. [23] consider algorithms for the multidimensional multi-objective variant of the knapsack problem.
Lu and Boutilier [34] studied a variant of the Chamberlin-Courant rule which includes knapsack constraints, and so, which is very similar to our diverse knapsack problem. The difference is that (i) they consider utilities which are extracted from the voters' preference rankings, thus these utilities have a specific structure, and (ii) in their model the items are not shared; instead, the selected items can be copied and distributed among the voters. Lu and Boutilier consider a model with additional costs related to copying a selected item and sending it to a voter. Consequently, their general model is more complex than our diverse knapsack; they also considered a more specific variant of this model, equivalent to winner determination under the Chamberlin-Courant rule.
The computational complexity of winner determination under the Chamberlin-Courant rule (i.e., the variant of the diverse knapsack, where the costs of all items are equal to one) has been extensively studied in the computational social choice (ComSoc) literature. Procaccia et al. [44] showed that the problem is NP-hard. The parameterized complexity of the problem was investigated by Betzler et al. [5] , and its computational complexity under restricted domains by Betzler et al. [5] , Yu et al. [55] , Elkind and Lackner [16] , Skowron et al. [51] , and Peters and Lackner [43] . Lu and Boutilier [34] and Skowron et al. [50] investigated approximation algorithms for the problem; superpolynomial (FPT) approximation algorithms have been considered by Skowron and Faliszewski [48] .
A variant of the diverse knapsack problem with the utilities satisfying a form of the triangle inequality is known under the name of the knapsack median problem; see the work of Byrka et al. [8] for a discussion on the approximability of the problem.
The Chamberlin-Courant method is a multiwinner election rule (in short, the multiagent knapsack model extends the multiwinner model by allowing the items to have different costs). There is a broad class of multiwinner rules aggregating voter preferences in various ways. In particular, there exists a number of spectra of rules "between" the individually best and the Chamberlin-Courant objectives [20, 31] . For an overview of other multiwinner rules which can be adapted to our setting, see [52, 19] .
As we discussed in the introduction, the multiagent variant of the knapsack problem has been often considered in the context of participatory budgeting, yet to the best of our knowledge this literature focused on the simplest aggregation rule corresponding to our individually best knapsack approach [9, 28, 4] . Another avenue has been explored by Fain et al. [18] , who studied rules that determine the level of funding provided to different projects (items, in our nomenclature) rather than rules selecting subsets of projects with predefined funding requirements.
As we mentioned before, Nash welfare is an established solution concept used in the literature on fair allocation [10, 38, 14, 46] . Nguyen et al. [40] provided a thorough survey on the complexity of computing Nash welfare in the context of allocating indivisible goods in the multiagent setting. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first work studying fairness solution concepts for the problem of selecting a collective knapsack.
Computing Collective Knapsacks
In this section we investigate the computational complexity of finding individually best, diverse, and fair knapsack. Formally, we define the computational problem for individually best knapsack as:
Individually Best Knapsack Input: An instance (V, A, u, c) and a budget B. Task: Compute a knapsack S ⊆ A such that c(S) ≤ B and u IB (S) =
We define the computational problems Diverse Knapsack and Fair Knapsack analogously-the difference is only in the expression to maximize, which for the two problems is u Div and u Fair , respectively. We will use the same names when referring to the decision variants of these problems; in such cases we will assume that one additional integer x is given in the input, and that the decision question is whether there exists S with value u IB (S) (respectively, u Div (S) or u Fair (S)) greater or equal to x, and c(S) ≤ B.
We observe that the functions u IB , u Div , and u Fair (when represented as a sum of logarithms) are submodular. Thus, we can use the algorithm of Sviridenko [53] with the following guarantees.
Theorem 1.
There exists a polynomial-time (1 − 1 /e)-approximation algorithm for Individually Best Knapsack, Diverse Knapsack, and Fair Knapsack.
In the remaining part of the paper we will focus on computing an exact solution to the three problems. In particular, we study the complexity under the following two restricted domains:
Single-peaked preferences [6, 1] . Let top i denote v i 's most preferred item, and let ⊳ be an order of the items. We say that a utility profile u is single-peaked with respect to ⊳ if for each a, b ∈ A and each v i ∈ V such that a ⊳ b ⊳ top i or top i ⊳ b ⊳ a we have that
Single-crossing preferences [36, 47] . Let ⊳ be an order of the voters. We say that a utility profile u is single-crossing with respect to ⊳ if for each two items a, b ∈ A the set
We say that a profile u is single-peaked (resp., single-crossing) if there exists an order ⊳ of the items (resp., of the voters) such that u is single-peaked (resp., single-crossing) with respect to ⊳. Note that an order witnessing single-peakedness or single-crossingness can be computed in polynomial time (see, e.g., [17] ).
We will also study the parameterized complexity of the three problems. For a given parameter p, we say that an algorithm for a problem is FPT with respect to p if it solves each instance I of the problem in O f (p) · poly(|I|) time, where f is some computable function. In the parameterized complexity theory, FPT algorithms are considered efficient. There is a whole hierarchy of complexity classes, but informally speaking, a problem that is W[1]-or W[2]-hard is assumed not to be FPT and, hence, hard from the parameterized point of view (see [13, 41, 24, 15] for more details on parameterized complexity).
Individually Best Knapsack
We first look at the simplest case of individually best knapsack. Theorem 2. Individually Best Knapsack is solvable in polynomial time when the utilities of voters are unary-encoded.
Proof. Consider an instance (V, A, u, c, B), and letû := v i ∈V a∈A u i (a). We apply dynamic programming with table T , where T [i, x] denotes the minimal cost of S ⊆ {a 1 , . . . , a i } with value u IB (S) at least equal to x. We initialize
By precomputing v j ∈V u j (a) for each a ∈ A, we get a running time of O(nm + mû).
Note that if the utilities are not encoded in unary, then the problem is NP-hard even for one voter (see Theorem 6).
Diverse Knapsack
We now turn our attention to the problem of computing a diverse knapsack. Through a straightforward reduction from the standard knapsack problem, we get that the problem is computationally hard even for profiles which are both single-peaked and single-crossing, unless the utilities are provided in unary encoding.
Theorem 3. Diverse Knapsack is NP-hard even for single-peaked and single-crossing utility profiles.
Proof. We present a many-one reduction from Knapsack. Let (X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, x, y) be an instance of Knapsack where each x i comes with value ν(x i ) ≥ 1 and weight ω(x i ); the question is whether there exists S ⊆ X with x i ∈S ν(x i ) ≥ x and x i ∈S ω(x i ) ≤ y. We set our set of items A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } with c(a i ) := ω(x i ) for each i ∈ [n]. We add n voters v 1 , . . . , v n with
It is immediate that for each S we have that 2 x if and only if x j ∈S ν(x j ) ≥ x, which proves the correctness. It is immediate to check that the utility profile is single-peaked and single-crossing.
Note that computing a diverse knapsack is also NP-hard for unary encoding, as it generalizes the Chamberlin-Courant rule, which is computationally hard [44] . For singlepeaked and single-crossing profiles the Chamberlin-Courant rule is computable in polynomial time [5, 51] . These known algorithms can be extended (by considering dynamic programs with induction running over other dimensions) to the case of the diverse knapsack.
Theorem 4. Diverse Knapsack is solvable in polynomial time when the utility profile is single-peaked and encoded in unary.
Proof. Consider an input instance (V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, A = {a 1 , . . . , a m }, u, c, B), where A is enumerated such that the order is single-peaked (note that such an ordering can be computed in polynomial time [17] ). Letû := v i ∈V a∈A u i (a). We apply dynamic programming with table T , where T [i, x] denotes the minimal cost of a subset S ⊆ {a 1 , . . . , a i } containing a i (a i ∈ S) with value at least equal to x (u Div (S) ≥ x). We define the helper function
where
Then we can derive the value of the best diverse knapsack from max{x | ∃i : (i, x) ∈ M }. We inductively argue over 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Clearly, the best diverse knapsack over item set {a 1 } has cost c(a 1 ). Consider T [i, x] with i > 1. Let A i ⊆ {a 1 , . . . , a i } be a set of items with value at least x of minimal cost containing a i . Then, either A i = {a i }, or A i = A j ∪ {a i }, where j ∈ [i − 1] with a j ∈ A i and there is no j ′ ∈ [i − 1] such that a j ′ ∈ A i and j < j ′ < i. In the first case, c(
Before we provide an analogous result for single-crossingness, let us define a set of useful tools. We will also use these tools later on, when analyzing the parameterized complexity of the problem.
Given a tuple of voters V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and a subset S ⊆ A of items, we define an assignment π S, V as a surjection [n] → S. An assignment is called connected, if for every s ∈ S it holds that π There is an ordering V on the voters V such that there is an S ⊆ A that forms a cost-minimal solution for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and for Diverse Knapsack.
Next, we give a dynamic program for computing knapsacks that qualitatively lie "between" optimal knapsacks for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and Diverse Knapsack (we will specify what we mean by "lying in between" later on).
Let us fix an input (V, A, u, c, B) and an ordering V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of the voters. We setû := n i=1 a∈A u i (a). We give a dynamic program with table T , where T [i, x] denotes "some" cost of a knapsack with a value assigned by voters from (v 1 , . . . , v i ) at least equal to x. We set T [1, x] = min{c(a) | a ∈ A, u 1 (a) ≥ x}, if there is an a ∈ A such that u 1 (a) ≥ x, and T [1, x] = ∞ otherwise. We define the helper function
otherwise.
We set
Observation 2. When the utilities are unary-encoded, we can compute all entries in T in polynomial time.
Lemma 1. Let S be a cost-minimal solution to Diverse Knapsack on (V, A, u, c) and
Proof. Suppose that this is not the case, that is, T [n, x] < c(S). Then we construct a knapsack S ′ from T [n, x] as follows. Let a ∈ A be an item that minimizes (1) for
, contradicting the fact that S is cost-minimal. Otherwise,
Then we proceed towards a contradiction as before: Let a ′ ∈ A be an item that minimizes (1) for T [j, x ′ ], then make a ′ ∈ S ′ , and continue the same reasoning.
We next give the relation to Ordered Diverse Knapsack.
Lemma 2. Let S be a cost-minimal solution to Ordered Diverse Knapsack on ( V , A, u, c) where V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is ordered and let x = u Ord (S). Then T [n, x] ≤ c(S).
Proof. Assume S = {s 1 , . . . , s ℓ } being enumerated. Let π S, V be an connected assignment such that
(S).
We have all ingredients at hand to prove our main results. Proposition 1. Diverse Knapsack is solvable in polynomial time when utility profiles are single-crossing and encoded in unary.
Proof. If V is a single-crossing ordering on the voters V , then there is an S ⊆ A that forms a cost-minimal solution for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and for Diverse Knapsack. By Lemmas 1 and 2 we are guaranteed that our algorithm will find it.
Further, we can use our tools to obtain an FPT algorithm (with respect to the number of voters) for unrestricted domains. Proof. By Observation 1, we know that there is an ordering V on the voters such that there is an S ⊆ A that forms a cost-minimal solution for Ordered Diverse Knapsack and for Diverse Knapsack. Together with Lemmas 1 and 2 we obtain that for V our dynamic program will find such S. Hence, for each ordering on the voters in V , we compute T [n, x]. Then, we take the minimum over all observed values. Note that x is the largest value such that T [n, x] ≤ B for some ordering on the voters in V . Altogether, this yields a running time of O(n! poly(û + n + m)) ⊆ O(2 n log n poly(û + n + m)).
Finally, we complement Theorem 5 by proving a lower bound on the running time, assuming ETH.
Proposition 2. Diverse Knapsack with binary utilities and unary costs is W[2]-hard
when parameterized by the budget B and, unless the ETH breaks, there is no 2 o(n+m) · poly(n + m) algorithm.
Proof. We give a many-one reduction from Dominating Set. An instance of dominating set consists of a graph G = (W, E) and an integer k; the question is whether there exists a subset S of at most k vertices such that for each vertex w ∈ W there is an s ∈ S such that w ∈ N G [s], where N G [s] = {v ∈ W | {v, s} ∈ E} ∪ {s} denotes the closed neighborhood of s in G. For each vertex w ∈ W , we introduce a voter v w to V and an item a w to A of cost one. We set u vw (a w ′ ) = 1, if w ′ ∈ N G [w], and u vw (a w ′ ) = 0, otherwise. Furthermore, we set the budget B = k. It is not difficult to see that there is a diverse knapsack S with c(S) ≤ B and u Div (S) ≥ n if and only if (G, k) is a yes-instance. As B = k and |V | = |A| = n, the lower bounds follow.
Fair Knapsack
Let us now turn to the problem of computing a fair knapsack. We first prove that the problem is NP-hard, even for restricted cases, and then we study its parameterized complexity. 
Proof. (1):
We provide a many-one reduction from the Partition problem [27] : Given a set S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } of n positive integers, the question is to decide whether there exists a subset S ′ ⊆ S such that s∈S ′ s = 1 2 s∈S s. Given an instance (S) of Partition where all integers are divisible by two, we construct an instance of Fair Knapsack as follows. Let T := s∈S s. For each s i ∈ S, we introduce an item a i with cost s i . Further, we introduce one voter v 1 with utility u 1 (a i ) = s i for each i ∈ [n]. We set the budget B = T /2, and we ask if there exists a knapsack with a Nash welfare W of at least T /2 + 1.
Let (S) be a yes-instance and let S ′ ⊆ S be a solution. Then, the subset of items A ′ := {a i ∈ A | s i ∈ S ′ } forms a fair knapsack, as a∈A ′ c(a) = s∈S ′ s = T /2 ≤ B, and the Nash welfare is at least 1 + a∈A ′ (u 1 (a)) = 1 + s∈S ′ s = T /2 + 1 Conversely, let the constructed instance of Fair Knapsack be a yes-instance, and let A ′ ⊆ A be a fair knapsack. Denote by S ′ the subset of integers in S corresponding to the items in A ′ . Then it holds that s∈S ′ s = a∈A ′ c(a) ≤ T /2. Moreover, 1 + s∈S ′ s = 1 + a∈A ′ (u 1 (a)) ≥ T /2 + 1. Together, both inequalities yield s∈S ′ = T /2, and hence S ′ forms a solution to (S).
(2): We provide a many-one reduction from the Exact Partition problem: Given a set S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } of n positive integers and an integer k ≥ 1, decide whether there is a subset S ′ ⊆ S with |S ′ | = k such that s∈S ′ s = 1 2 s∈S s. Given an instance (S, k) of Exact Partition where all integers are divisible by two and by k, we construct an instance of Fair Knapsack as follows. Similarly as before we set T := s∈S s. For each s i ∈ S, we introduce an item a i with cost 1. Further, we introduce two voters, v 1 and v 2 , with utility functions u 1 (a i ) = T + s i and u 2 (a i ) = T + T k − s i , respectively. We set the budget B = k and ask for a knapsack with a Nash welfare W at least equal to (1 + kT + T /2) 2 .
Let (S, k) be a yes-instance and let S ′ ⊆ S be a solution. We claim that the subset of items A ′ := {a i ∈ A | s i ∈ S ′ } forms an appropriate fair knapsack. It holds that a∈A ′ c(a) = |S ′ | = k ≤ B. The Nash welfare is at least
Conversely, let the constructed instance of Fair Knapsack be a yes-instance, and let A ′ ⊆ A be a corresponding fair knapsack. Let S ′ denote the subset of integers in S corresponding to the items in A ′ . Then it holds that |S ′ | = a∈A ′ c(a) ≤ k. Moreover, for each item a ∈ A it holds that u 1 (a) + u 2 (a) = 2T + T /k, and hence
. Together, it follows that |A ′ | = k, and hence S ′ forms a solution for (S, k). 
We construct an instance of Fair Knapsack as follows. Let A := {a i | F i ∈ F} be the set of items each with cost equal to one. Further, we introduce n voters with u i (a j ) = 1 if x i ∈ F j , and u i (a j ) = 0 otherwise, for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]. We set B = k and the desired Nash welfare to W = 2 dk . This finishes the construction.
Assume that (X, F, k) admits a solution F ′ . We claim that A ′ := {a i ∈ A | F i ∈ F ′ } is a fair knapsack with the desired value of the Nash welfare (note that |A ′ | = k). By the construction, each item a ∈ A contributes one to exactly d voters. Moreover, each distinct a, a ′ ∈ A ′ contribute to disjoint sets of voters. Hence,
Conversely, let A ′ ⊆ A be a fair knapsack, and let F ′ = {F i ∈ F | a i ∈ A ′ }. We claim that F ′ forms a solution to (X, F, k). First, observe that 1≤i≤n a∈A ′ u i (a) = |A ′ |d. Let
For the second inequality, observe that the function (1 + y/x) x is increasing on the interval (0, y] for every y > 0. Hence, we have that |A ′ | = k and |M | = k · d. Thus, F ′ is a set of exactly k pairwise disjoint sets.
Given that Exact Regular Set Packing (ERSP) is W[1]-hard with respect to the size of the solution [2] , the proof of Theorem 6 (3) implies the following. Using a more clever construction, we can show that for the combination of the two parameters-the number of voters and the budget-we still get fixed-parameter intractability. Proof. We provide a parameterized reduction from the k-Multicolored Clique problem, which is known to be W[1]-hard with respect to the number of colors [22] . Let I be an instance of k-Multicolored Clique. In I we are given a graph G with the set of vertices V (G) and the set of edges E(G), a natural number k ∈ N, and a coloring function f : V (G) → [k] that assigns one of k colors to each vertex. We ask if G contains k pairwise connected vertices, each having a different color. Without loss of generality we assume that k ≥ 2.
From I we construct an instance I F of Fair Knapsack as follows (we refer to Figure 1 for an illustration). Let T = |V (G)|. We set the set of items to V (G) ∪ E(G), that is we associate one item with each vertex and with each edge. We construct the set of voters as follows (unless specified otherwise, by default we assume that a voter assigns utility of zero to an item):
(1) For each color we introduce one voter who assigns utility of T to each vertex with this color. Clearly, there are k such voters.
(2) For each pair of two different colors we introduce k − 2 voters, each assigning utility of T to each edge that connects two vertices with these two colors. There are (k − 2) k 2 such voters.
. . . 
(3) (3) For each ordered pair of colors, c 1 and c 2 , with c 1 = c 2 we introduce two vertices, call them a and b, with the following utilities. Consider the set of vertices with color c 1 and rename them in an arbitrary way so that they can be put in a sequence n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n ℓ . For each i ∈ [ℓ] voter a assigns utility i to vertex n i and utility (T − i) to each edge that connects n i with a vertex with color c 2 . Voter b assigns utility (T − i) to n i and utility i to each edge that connects n i with a vertex with color c 2 . There are 2k(k − 1) such voters.
We set the cost of each item to one, and the total budget to B = k + k 2 . By a simple calculation one can check that the total number of voters is equal to k + (k − 2) · k 2 + 2k(k − 1) = kB. This completes our construction.
First, observe that in total each item is assigned utility of kT from all the voters. Indeed, each item corresponding to a vertex gets utility of T from exactly one voter from the first group, and total utility of (k − 1) · T from 2(k − 1) voters from the third group. Similarly, each item corresponding to an edge gets utility of T from k − 2 voters from the second group, and total utility of 2 · T from four voters from the third group. Thus, independently of how we select B items, the sum of the utilities they are assigned from the voters will always be the same, that is BkT . Thus, clearly the Nash welfare would be maximized if the total utility assigned to the selected items by each voter is the same, and equal to T . Only in such case the Nash welfare would be equal to (T + 1) kB . We will show, however, that each voter assigns to the set of B items utility T if and only if k out of such items are vertices with k different colors, the remaining k 2 of such items are edges, and each selected edge connects two selected vertices.
Indeed, it is easy to see that if the selected set of items has the structure as described above, then each voter assigns to this set the utility of T . We will now prove the other implication. Assume that for the set of B items S each voter assigns total utility of T . By looking at the first group of voters, we infer that k items from S correspond to the vertices, and that these k vertices have different colors. By looking at the second group of voters, we infer that for each pair of two different colors, S contains exactly one edge connecting vertices with such colors. Finally, by looking at the third group of voters we infer that each edge from S that connects colors c 1 and c 2 is adjacent to the vertices from S with colors c 1 and c 2 . This completes the proof.
On the other hand, each instance I of Fair Knapsack with utilities represented in unary encoding is solvable in O(|I| f (n) ) time (it is in XP when parameterized by n), where n is the number of voters and f is some computable function only depending on n. Proof. We provide an algorithm based on dynamic programing. We construct a table T where for each sequence of n + 1 integers, z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n , and i, entry T [z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n , i] represents the lowest possible value of the budget x such that there exists a knapsack S with the following properties: (i) the total cost of all items in the knapsack is equal to x (i.e., x = a∈S c(a)), (ii) the last index of an item in the knapsack S is i (i.e., i = max a j ∈S j), and (iii) for each voter v j we have that a∈S u j (a) = z j . This table can be constructed recursively:
We handle the corner cases by setting T [0, 0, . . . , 0, i] = 0 for each i, and
Clearly, if n is fixed and if the utilities are represented in unary encoding, then the table can be filled in polynomial time. Now, it is sufficient to traverse the table and to find the entry T [z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n , i] ≤ B which maximizes n j=1 (z j + 1).
On the positive side, with stronger requirements on the voters' utilities, that is, if the number of different values over the utility functions is small, we can strengthen Theorem 8 and prove the membership in FPT. Proof. We will use the classic result of Lenstra [33] which says that an integer linear program (ILP) can be solved in FPT time with respect to the number of integer variables. We will also use a recent result of Bredereck et al. [7] who proved that one can apply concave/convex transformations of certain variables in an ILP, and that such a modified program can be still solved in an FPT time. We construct an ILP as follows. Let U be the set of values that a utility function can take. For each vector z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) with z i ∈ U for each i, we define A z as the set of items a such that for each voter v i we have u i (a) = z i . Intuitively, A z describes a subcollection of the items with the same "type": such items are indistinguishable when we look only at the utilities assigned by the voters; they may vary only with their costs. For each such a set A z we introduce an integer variable x z which intuitively denotes the number of items from the optimal solution that belong to A z . Further, we construct a function f z such that f z (x) is the cost of the x cheapest items from A z ; clearly f z is convex. We formulate the following program: maximize:
The above program uses concave transformations (logarithms) for the maximized expression, and convex transformations (functions f z ) in the left-hand sides of the constraints, so we can use the result of Bredereck et al. [7] and claim that this program can be solved in an FPT time with respect to the number of integer variables. This completes the proof.
Fair Knapsack under Restricted Domains
In contrast to Individually Best Knapsack and Diverse Knapsack, both being solvable in polynomial time on restricted domains, computing a fair knapsack remains NP-hard on utility profiles that are even both, single-peaked and single-crossing.
Theorem 10. Fair Knapsack is NP-hard even on single-peaked single-crossing domains, when the costs of all items are equal to one, and the utilities of each voter come from the set {0, . . . 6}.
Proof. We give a many-one reduction from the NP-hard Exact-Set-Cover (X3C) problem: Given a universe U with 3k elements and a set F of 3-size subsets of U , the question is to decide whether there exist exactly k subsets in F that cover U . Without loss of generality, we can additionally assume that each element in U appears in exactly three sets from F [27] . Given an instance (U = {e 1 , . . . , e n }, F = {F 1 , . . . , F m }) of X3C (note that n = m = 3k), we compute an instance of the problem of computing a fair knapsack as follows (the utilities of the voters are depicted in Figure 2 ).
First, for each i ∈ [m], we introduce two items, a i and a 2m−i , that correspond to set F i , each with the cost of one. Further, we introduce three different types of voters:
(1) We add two voters x 1 and x 2 with u x 1 (a i ) = u x 1 (a m+i ) − 6 = 0 and u x 2 (a m+i ) = u x 2 (a i ) − 6 = 0 for all i ∈ [m]. 
and u y
(a 2m−j+1 ). 
(a 2m−j+1 ), where
We set the budget to B = 2k and the required Nash welfare to W = (6k + 1) 2+2m (6k + 2) 2n . It is apparent that with the order (a 1 , . . . , a 2m ), this is profile is single-peaked. For singlecrossingness, note that the utilities of agents x i , y witnesses single-crossingness.
We will prove that (U = {e 1 , . . . , e 3k }, F = {F 1 , . . . , F m }) is a yes-instance for X3C if and only if the constructed instance of Fair Knapsack is a yes-instance.
(
} is a fair knapsack. First observe that c(S) = 2k ≤ B. We consider the welfare for each of the three types (1)- (3) of voters separately.
For x 1 and x 2 (1), we have a∈S u x 1 (a) = a∈S u x 2 (a) = 6k.
Next, consider the voters of type (2) . Consider y
By symmetry,
Finally, consider the voters of type (3). Consider a voter z
. Let j * be the index such that e i ∈ F b j * (recall exact cover). We have
By symmetry, a∈S u z Hence, we get in total that the Nash welfare is equal to (1 + 6k) 2 (1 + 6k) 2m (2 + 6k) 2n = W .
(⇐) Let S ⊆ {a 1 , . . . , a 2m } be a fair knapsack with c(S) ≤ 2k and with the Nash welfare at least equal to W . We will now show that the total utility that all voters assign to each item a j ∈ A is equal to 6 + 6m + 6n + 3. Indeed, the two voters from (1) assign to a j the total utility of 6. Similarly, any pair of voters, y 2 , assigns utility of 6 to a j . Finally, observe that, whenever e i ∈ F j , then voters z 2 assign utility of 7 to a j ; otherwise they assign utility of 6 to a j . Since each set F j contains exactly 3 elements, we get that a j gets total utility of (n − 3)6 + 3 · 7 from the voters from (3).
Hence, 2k items contribute 2k(6 + 6m + 6n + 3) to the total utility, and so, for the Nash welfare to be equal to W , this total utility must be distributed as equally as possible among the voters. Specifically, 2m + 2 voters need to get the total utility of 6k, and 2n voters must get the total utility of 6k + 1. Now, we claim that for each i ∈ [m], a i ∈ S ⇐⇒ a 2m−i+1 ∈ S. Suppose this is not the case, and let i ∈ [m] be the smallest index such that either (i) a i ∈ S ∧ a 2m−i+1 ∈ S or (ii) a i ∈ S ∧ a 2m−i+1 ∈ S. Consider the first case (i). Let k 1 = |{1 ≤ j ≤ i | a j ∈ S}| and k 2 = |{2m − i + 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m | a j ∈ S}|. It holds that k 1 ≥ k 2 + 1, and it follows for voter y (a j ) = k 1 6 + (2k − (k 1 + k 2 )) · 3 + k 2 · 0 = 3(2k + (k 1 − k 2 )) ≥ 6k + 3 / ∈ {6k, 6k + 1}.
Case (ii) works analogously, and hence, our claim follows. From this we infer that a∈S u y (ℓ) i (a) = 6k for each i ∈ {1, 2} and ℓ ∈ [m], and that a∈S u x i (a) = 6k for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, for each voter z from (3) it must be the case that a∈S u z (a) = 6k+1.
Finally, we will prove that F ′ = {F b 1 , . . . , F b k } = {F i ∈ F | a i ∈ S, i ∈ [m]} forms a cover of U . Towards a contradiction suppose that there is an element e i ∈ U such that e i is not covered by F ′ . We consider voter z Thus, we reached a contradiction, and consequently we get that every element in U is covered by F. This completes the proof.
As we discussed in Section 2, if the voters' utilities come from the binary set {0, 1} and if the costs of the items are equal to one, then the problem of computing a fair knapsack is equivalent to computing winners according to Proportional Approval Voting. For this case with single-peaked preferences, Peters [42] showed that the problem can be formulated as an integer linear program with total unimodular constraints, and thus it is solvable in polynomial time. This makes our result interesting, as it shows that by allowing slightly more general utilities (coming from the set {0, . . . , 6}, instead of {0, 1}) the problem becomes already NP-hard (even if we additionally assume single-crossingness of the preferences). This draws quite an accurate line separating instances which are computationally easy from those which are intractable.
Conclusion
In this paper we study three variants of the knapsack problem in multiagent settings. One of these variants, selecting an individually best knapsack, has been considered in the literature before, and this work introduces the other two concepts: diverse and fair knapsack. Our paper establishes a relation between the multi-objective knapsack problem and a broad literature including a literature on multiwinner voting and on fair allocation. This way, we expose a variety of ways in which the preferences of the voters can be aggregated in a number of real-life scenarios that are captured by the abstract model of the multiagent knapsack.
Our computational results are outlined in Table 1 . In summary, our results show that the problem of computing an individually-best or a diverse knapsack can be handled efficiently under some simplifying assumptions. On the other hand, we give multiple evidences that computing a fair knapsack is a hard problem. Thus, this research provides theoretical foundations motivating, and calls for, studying approximation and heuristic algorithms for the problem of computing a fair knapsack.
